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Abstract 
As supply chains become more complex and global, organizations increasingly rely on advanced 
information technology systems to coordinate and support value chain activities.  These 
interorganizational systems while integral to supply chain management also introduce an additional point 
of vulnerability. Although a matter of increasing concern, who and how the responsibility for securing 
these systems is governed is not well understood. We propose a conceptual framework for how these 
security decisions can be made in different types of value chains by combining value chain governance 
archetypes with the information security governance decisions that need to be made for different contexts.  
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Introduction 
With complex supply chains that cross national and organizational boundaries, each organization has less 
and less control of what goes out and what enters into its own supply chain. Global supply chains are now 
a part of the war on terror as the focus has shifted from the things taken out of the supply chains to the 
things put in the supply chain that pose a threat to security. Supply chain security requires the 
“application of policies, procedures, and technology to protect supply chain assets from theft, damage, or 
terrorism, and to prevent the unauthorized introduction of contraband, people, or weapons of mass 
destruction into the supply chain” (Closs and McGarrell 2004, p. 8).  Not surprisingly the issue of 
securing supply chains has generated considerable interest in both practice and research and is emerging 
as a multi-disciplinary area of research (Gould et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2008; Lee 2004). 
Organizations increasingly rely on advanced information technologies and digital platforms to coordinate 
their value chain activities. Although there is increasing interest on the issue of supply chain security, 
apart from the cautionary anecdotes highlighting the gravity of the issue, not much is said about securing 
information and information technology (IT) systems in the context of value chains. The recent breach of 
credit and debit card data at Target attracted much attention in the media.  According to reports, the 
initial intrusion into Target’s systems could be traced back to a third party vendor for refrigeration and 
HVAC systems (Newman 2014). The incident underscores our use of the term ‘value chain’ rather than 
supply chain, even though we refer to and draw upon supply chain literature. Use of the term value chain 
takes into consideration variants of interorganizational relationships beyond the supply chain context 
such as, outsourcing and various other external entities, which may be other businesses, individual 
customers or the government (Dutta and McCrohan 2002). Approaching information assurance and 
cybersecurity from a value chain perspective emphasizes the importance of not only protecting activities 
in the internal value chain, but, interactions with other organizations in its ecosystems. While partnership 
has been an extensively studied topic in research (Patnayakuni et al. 2006), and coordination with value 
chain partners has been considered a sine qua non for implementing security (Closs and McGarrell 2004), 
organizations are often woefully unaware of what their partners are even doing as far as security is 
concerned.  
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IT governance decisions focus on who makes IT decisions and how are these decisions made in an 
organization (Weill 2004). These decisions could be related to what technologies to invest in, what 
standards to enforce, what information to share and how to integrate applications across the value chain. 
Investment in technologies is considered key to implementing value chain security whether these are 
technologies such as, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), or an understanding and coordination of 
what value chain members are doing about firewalls, anti-virus, encryption programs and information 
security policies.  Frameworks and standards have also been developed to guide the management and 
governance of IT security ranging from the general Control Objective for Information and Related 
Technology (COBIT) to the more specific ISO 27000 series that provides guidelines for information 
security management within the organization and ISO 27036 that deals with information security with 
value chain partners.  Standards such as, ISO 27036 enable organizations to manage not only security 
related to malware, compliance, communication and networks but, also security related to partner 
relationships and delivery management. Section 15 of this standard on partner relationships, which was 
new in 2013 requires that organizations have policies, and procedures in place to protect their 
information that is accessible to partners as well as audit delivery of services from value chain partners.  
In a global value chain, integrating and coordinating these federated and distributed security decisions is 
not a one size fits all approach. Research on valuechain governance looks at how value chains are 
managed from arms-length relationships, to partnerships and centralized hierarchies.  For any given 
organization, its relationship with different value chain partners may require different approaches to 
governance. Some approaches to managing security will be more appropriate with partners while other 
approaches will be more appropriate for turn-key and captive partners. A better understanding of the 
governance of value chain security decisions is required to provide a best practice model of how 
organizations should approach the question of managing security in their value chain. There needs to be 
coordination, communication and information sharing between members in the organization’s value 
chain (Helferich and Cook 2002) regarding information security and technologies and systems that 
instantiate and enforce this security.  Information security governance in value chains will draw from our 
understanding of IT governance and governance of value chain systems as well as the socio-technical 
issues related to information security. In this paper we develop a framework for governance of 
information security across organizations in the value chain. 
IT Governance 
Weill (2004) defines IT governance as “specifying the framework for decision rights and accountabilities 
to encourage desired behavior in the use of IT”.  They argue that governance is not about specific 
decisions about IT in the organization rather about who makes what decisions, who has input and how the 
decision makers are held accountable.  Effective governance, according to them, is not only about 
ensuring compliance with the organization’s policies, procedures, principles and vision but, to ensure 
consistency with its strategy while fostering creativity and resourcefulness of all its employees in using IT. 
The IT Governance Institute publishes COBIT, a framework for governance and management of 
enterprise IT.  The framework provides detailed and comprehensive guidelines that are operationally 
focused around implementation and control.  Other view governance as ways in which individuals and 
organizations solve the problem of coordination that can refer to routine operational coordination, but, is 
generally viewed in a strategic context (Markus and Bui 2012). 
The role of IT strategy, IT architecture, IT infrastructure, business application needs and investment 
decisions are considered to be the five key domains of IT governance (Weill 2004). Who, where and how 
these decisions are made in an organization is one of the key issues in IT governance, whether these 
decisions are centralized or decentralized. Decision archetypes for making these decisions can range from 
business monarchy, IT monarchy, and federated systems all the way to disjointed feudal decision making 
and anarchy (Weill 2004). The research showed that profitable organizations tend to rely on centralized 
structures, fast growing organizations relied on decentralized structures and an asset management focus 
was associated with federated hybrid structures for IT governance. For organizations with a multinational 
footprint, Sia et al. (2010) develop a model for structuring global IT resources that meet their needs for 
scale and responsiveness that include shared IT services, centers of excellence and IT value managers. 
Sharing IT services that are resource intensive enable organizations to meet the needs of scale through 
outrsourcing, standardization and consolidation. Centers of excellence focus on knowledge and expertise 
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pooling and best practice sharing across the global organization. IT Value managers bridge the gap 
between the local and the global by maintaining local relationships to champion local IT issues while 
enabling implementation of global systems.  
Research on IT governance in the interorganizational context is relatively sparse.  Markus and Bui (2012) 
review theories based on governance of social services networks, financial exchanges and business 
alliances to examine the governance of interorganization coordination hubs.  Chatterjee and 
Ravichandran (2013) examine governance of interorganizational systems in terms of financial and 
transactional governance.  Other argue that in global organizations and value chains, IT governance 
decisions are likely to be federated (Peterson 2004). In federated decision structures the infrastructure 
decisions are centralized while the application or technology use decisions may be decentralized (Brown 
and Magill 1998). Federated governance models present challenges in coordination and conflict 
resolution as the locus of control of decision making is dispersed. While standardization and service level 
agreements (SLA) can provide some level of vertical integration in federated environments, horizontal 
integration is needed to manage these distributed, dispersed decisions (Brown 1999; Peterson et al. 2000) 
. Horizontal integration capabilities refer to the coordination of IT decisions made across business unit 
and organizational boundaries. Eventually effective governance is realized through deliberately and 
strategically designed governance mechanisms such as, committees, budgeting and approval processes, 
structure of the IT organization, charge back mechanisms etc. (Weill and Woodham 2003).  While Weill 
and Ross (2005) propose decision making structures, alignment processes and formal communications as 
a framework for these governance mechanisms, others have proposed structure, process and 
communication (Ehsani and Lorenzo 2008) and similarly structure, process and people (Ko and Fink 
2010).  Drawing on the broad themes we propose structure, process and relational (Peterson 2004) IT 
governance as an appropriate framework that can be applied to examining information security in value 
chains. Organizations can use structural components such as, teams and liaison roles; process 
components such as, standardization and codification of the decision making process; and relational 
components such as, common learning and consensus building to manage federated security decision 
across the value chain. 
IT Security Governance 
The need for governance of information security in organizations has been recognized by both research 
and practice (Information Technology Governance Institute 2001; Straub et al. 2008). Information 
security governance has been conceptualized as either a subset of IT governance or corporate governance 
in organizations (McFadzean et al. 2007) or extending the already accepted definitions of IT governance 
(Allen 2005). Technical solutions are required but, not sufficient in meeting the challenges such as, loss of 
intellectual property, malicious attacks, information breaches and compromise of reputation. There is a 
need to move away from only technical and engineering centric approaches to security to enterprise 
based, “risk management, organizational continuity and resilience perspective” (Allen 2005, pg.29). Even 
though most organizations understand the importance of information security, they continue to view it as 
a technical issue solely under the purview of the IT function. Information security is a management issue 
that requires an end to end view of the business processes (Dutta and McCrohan 2002). In value chains 
the governance of information systems is not under the control of a single organization because of its 
inherent complexity but, a responsibility shared across organizations (Holgate et al. 2012). The inherent 
architecture of the Internet, its use as a platform for commerce and the often extensive value chain 
partnering network make it difficult to identify and define the boundary of an organization’s information 
systems. 
There are a variety of information security governance frameworks available but, there is not one that is 
predominant (Holgate et al. 2012). Already mentioned here, frameworks like COBIT and ISO provide 
normative standards, models and practices for governing information security.  In the context of value 
networks the responsibility for governance of security is rarely resident with single organization. Not 
surprisingly in value chain relationships, the web of trust plays a significant part in information security 
and management of relationships and often seems to be the primary means of security governance 
(Williams et al. 2008). While trust could be an important precondition, ensuring security will require the 
coordination, communication and collaboration based on multilateral relationships across organizational 
boundaries.  Governance of information security will necessitate networked type governance mechanisms 
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with shared responsibility and accountability. In addition, third party providers, standard setting 
institutions and government government agencies would likely play a role in developing 
interorganizational structures, processes and relational imperatives for governance in the value chain 
network. 
Value Chain Governance 
Governance in an interorganizational context has been an issue examined from several different 
disciplinary perspectives. Gulati and Singh (1998) identify three forms of governance as contracts, 
minority equity investments and joint ventures.  Earlier Pisano and Teece (1989) studied R&D consortia, 
which could be considered as fourth form of governance (Markus and Bui 2012).  In their analysis, 
Markus and Bui (2012) also identify related work by Provan and Kenis (2008) on governance of social 
services networks in public administration.  Provan and Kenis identify three forms of governance, which 
could be considered relevant to value chain networks as participant-governed networks, lead organization 
governance and governance by network administrative organization, which is an administrative entity 
solely for the purpose of coordinating others without participating in actually delivering services.  The last 
form of governance would be very similar to the call for third party coordination in supply chains by 
Bitran et al. (2007).  Chatterjee and Ravichandran (2013) draw upon resource dependence theory to 
examine financial and transactional governance of interorganizational systems. 
In this paper we use the theoretical typology developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) to propose our framework 
for information security governance.  They draw upon transaction cost economics, production networks, 
and technology capability and firm-level learning to identify three critical variables – complexity of 
transactions, ability to codify transactions and capabilities of the supply-base - to explain patterns of 
governance in global value chains.  Gereffi et al. argue that based on the degree of explicit coordination 
and power asymmetry, supply chain governance can be characterized on a spectrum where markets would 
be at one end of the spectrum and hierarchies at the other end. Based on their theory they propose five 
governance archetypes for global value chains as markets, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy. 
Market relationships have low switching costs while hierarchies would be characterized by managerial 
control and vertical integration. Where there is limited explicit coordination in market based transactions, 
hierarchies would be associated with the need to extensively share and control tacit knowledge. The three 
intermediate archetypes of modular, relational and captive value chains represent different configurations 
of the three critical variables.   
Organizations maintain long term partnerships with other value chain members when they engage in 
complex transactions with capable suppliers but, find that intangible and tacit knowledge issues make it 
difficult to codify the handoffs from the value chain relationship in relational value chains. Modular value 
chains consist of turn-key suppliers who make products, which require relation specific investments but, 
do not require any transaction specific investments for the value chain.  In modular value chains tacit 
knowledge is hidden in the specifications of the module. When the ability to codify transactions is high, 
organizations are likely to have a modular relationship with their value chain partners.  But when the 
ability to codify is high, but, suppliers are not very capable, they are governed as captive suppliers. Captive 
suppliers are likely to make significant transaction specific investments in the relationship and are 
dependent on their customer for knowledge based activities, technology upgrades and complex design 
tasks. We use the factors of complexity, codification and supplier capability maturity that define the 
archetypes of value chain governance to define the nature of information security decisions. The degree of 
control, coordination and collaboration in information security decisions in value chains depends on the 
complexity of the security decision, the ease with which it can be codified and the maturity and capability 
of the supplier in information security. Table 1 provides examples of the complexity, codification and 
capability maturity of suppliers for information security transactions. Figure 1 then presents how the 
three variables will influence information security decisions across the five types of governance archetypes 
adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005). 
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Complexity of Decisions 
Uncertain information security risks, high risk and 
or value of intellectual property or information 
theft 
Ability to Codify Decisions 
Security goals, standards and policies and 
compliance obligations can be clearly defined 
Supplier Capability Maturity 
Supplier has a validated plan to identify and 
protect information security assets, including 
vulnerability assessments. Supplier has a business 
continuity plan 
Table 1. Characteristics of Information Security Decisions 
 
 
Value Chain Governance Information Security Decisions 
 Complexity Codification Supplier 
Capability 
Market Increases Increases 
 
Increases 
 
Modular 
Relational 
Captive 
Increases 
 
Increases 
 
Hierarchy 
Figure 1: Information Security Decisions in Different Value Chain Governance Types 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Combining value chain governance types with information security governance decisions that need to be 
made, we have developed a conceptual framework of how these security decisions should be made in 
different types of value chains. Governance of security decisions across the value chain is likely to be 
dependent on both the nature of those decisions characterized by their complexity, codification and 
supplier maturity and the nature of value chain governance archetypes.  
In most cases the governance of security decisions will flow from the governance of the value chain 
relationship. For example in market based relationships, organizations should be able to codify and 
outsource their decisions to their global suppliers without much detailed intervention and coordination.  
Security decisions can be standardized using the ISO 27000 series framework and the codification of 
those decisions using standards would enable organizations to better coordinate with their arms-length 
suppliers. Standardization of transactions would work as a process mechanism for horizontal information 
security governance in value chains. Cross functional teams and liaison roles could be used as structural 
mechanisms to coordinate security decisions in modular and relational value chains.  Other formal 
mechanism that institutionalize processes for making IT security decisions such as, frameworks, 
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methodologies, and rules for review and service level agreements would be applicable in certain value 
chain contexts. Relational coordination mechanisms for value chain security would include colocation, 
frequent communication, high level of trust, with low power asymmetry, shared learning, knowledge and 
information sharing, and common goal setting routines. Table 2 provides examples of the governance 
mechanisms for coordinating information security decisions in the value chain.  
• Structural integration  
o Institutionalized teams and inter-organizational liaison roles with suppliers to make 
decisions related to IT infrastructure and value chain security  
o Right to audit and compliance control by focal firm 
o Clear ownership, accountability and responsibility for the protection of valuable 
information assets, including security logs, audit records and forensic evidence 
• Process integration 
o Standards such as, ISO 27000 series 
o Define formal processes for risk analysis, security design, identity and access 
management, incident management and business continuity 
• Relational integration 
o Trust environment with shared responsibility for information security 
o Shared responsibility for design of policies and compliance  
Table 2: Information Security Governance Mechanisms in Value Chains 
 
In global value chain hierarchies with common ownership, value chain security decisions can be 
coordinated by both structural and relational mechanisms. The necessity for codification and 
standardization of every aspect of governance and security decision making is likely to be lower than in 
hands-off relationships and will also limited by the inability of hierarchies to codify every aspect of the 
transaction due to the predominance of tacit knowledge in the relationship. Organizations that deal with 
intellectual property that has a very high value, work in cutting edge technologies where security risks and 
attack methods are uncertain and do not have suppliers with mature information security governance are 
likely to insource their security decisions.  
In markets and modular value chains locus of control for security governance decisions is likely to be 
decentralized to value chain partners. Main source of coordination would be process integration - the 
formalization and codification of security related rules at points of handoffs between organizations. In 
market based exchange, since many relationships are transitory, formalization would be minimal and 
security need not to be managed with reliance on third parties for audit and certification. In contrast, in 
modular value chains, because the complexity of transactions is higher, which entail higher risk of 
information leakage and potential security vulnerabilities, organizations can use other process 
coordination mechanisms such as, formal process and standard reviews and SLAs.   
In relational value chains locus of control for security decisions will be shared between value chain 
partners. Informal trust and shared understanding provide the basis for security governance decisions. 
Organizations could also rely on structural means of integration such as, cross functional teams. The use 
of structural mechanisms such as, cross functional teams allows for frequent communication and 
interaction routines that enable the development of shared understanding of value chain security. In 
captive value chains the controlling organization can enforce security decisions with process 
standardization and formalization. The conceptual framework is presented below in Table 3.  
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Value Chain 
Governance 
Locus of Control Structural 
Integration 
Process 
Integration 
Relational 
Integration 
Market  Decentralized  Low  Low 
Standards 
Low  
Modular  Decentralized  Low  Medium 
High 
Standards, SLA’s  
Process Reviews 
Low  
Relational  Shared  Medium 
Not authority 
but  
Cross-Functional 
Teams  
Low -Medium 
Inability to 
codify value 
chain 
transactions 
Formal 
Processes  
Trust 
Information Sharing’ 
Common Goals  
Captive  Centralized  Medium  
Authority and 
focal 
organization 
directed security 
initiatives 
High 
Standards, SLA’s 
and Frequent 
Process Reviews  
Low  
Hierarchy  Centralized  High 
Formal 
Authority 
Low 
standardization, 
varying levels of 
rules and process 
reviews for 
decision making 
Medium-High 
Frequent 
communication 
Common Goals 
Information Sharing 
Table 3: Information Security Governance for Value Chains 
The locus of control for information security decisions would range from centralized for hierarchies and 
captive organizations to decentralized for market based and modular organizations. When organizations 
decide to outsource their products and services to global value chains there are situations where value 
chain governance archetypes defined by transaction characteristics mismatch with the value chain 
governance requirements for information security decisions. When organizations have offshore providers 
in the developing world they are mostly treated as arms- length market based suppliers, the only mode of 
information security governance is the implementation of standards such as ISO. If an organization 
perceived that the complexity of security transactions result in intellectual property risk or uncertainty, 
modular information or captive value chain governance structures may be more appropriate so that a 
greater degree of control may be exercised over the partners. 
There may be a mismatch between a value chain partner’s transactional capabilities and its information 
security management capabilities. Trying to formulate long term relationships with partners through trust 
and information sharing may backfire if the partner has poor history and lacks capabilities in developing 
and implementing security policy. To compensate for the lack of partner experience in security, the focal 
organization may choose to either increase the level of codification and standardization of its security 
goals or exert greater authority and control on a relational partner’s information security policy. The 
concepts of value chain governance, information security decisions and horizontal coordination 
mechanisms provide organizations with a toolset to evaluate how to govern information security decisions 
for the value chain.  
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Conclusion 
Information security governance is not solely about technical issues such as, firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, asset identification, risk assessment and vulnerability scanning with an inward and internal 
focus. Besides technical risk factors, there are various organizational risk factors such as, proprietary high 
value information assets, intense competition, rapid growth and the signaling effect of targeting a well 
know organization (NDIA 2000). Value chains make it very difficult for organizations to identify the 
boundaries of their information system with that of their partner and supplier organizations. Information 
security “requires an end to end view of business processes” (Datta and McRohan 2002, p 72).  
Senior management needs to pay attention to information security by providing the IT security function 
and role with adequate authority to participate in and control decisions related to vendor selection, 
outsourcing, supplier and service provide selection. They need to propagate a culture of security and 
balance it with availability, innovation and customer service and even more so in the case of startups 
organizations such as, Snapchat, Twitter etc. that are intently focused on functionality and adoption at the 
expense of security. Small startup organizations are unlikely to have procedures for access control, 
configuration management and vulnerability assessment. Security is especially likely to be a casualty in 
information sharing and end to end integrated organizations because adequate data and accessibility 
controls may not take precedence over efficiency, and flexibility. 
Information security should be a critical factor in the consideration of value chain partners, not only in its 
own policies but, the security and business continuity policies and procedures of its first and in some 
cases second tier suppliers. If a partner’s plans do not meet the needs of protecting the organizations key 
information assets based on a threat and vulnerability assessment the organization has the option of 
either changing their partners or implementing different information security governance practices than 
those based on the value chain archetype. Usually this may take the form of either upgrading the 
organizations control over the partner’s information security or increasing the level of standardization 
and codification of information security requirements. Increased standardization and codification could 
also enable an organization to search for alternate suppliers or decrease the level of structural authority 
and control over their value chain partners.  
When the coordination costs of managing a partner’s information security policies tend to be high, 
especially in terms of managing structural overlays, continuous process monitoring, and standardization 
is not feasible because of the complexity of information security decisions, organizations can choose 
capable and mature suppliers and develop relational trust based organizational routines for information 
security. When complexity and threats are not a constraining factor, arms-length market based 
relationships with minimally codified information security requirements may be appropriate for 
information security governance. When transaction complexity and ability to codify are both available to 
organizations the choice of a governance relationship would depend on supplier capability. 
The framework for informations security governance presented in this paper draws upon literature in 
value chain governance, IT governance and information security governance to provide guidelines for 
evaluating and thinking about information security governance in value chains. Organizations may face 
situations where the governance mechanisms based on value chain archetypes may not match the 
governance requirements based on information security needs. It is possible that relational suppliers may 
not have maturity and capability in information security policy and implementation. Organizations that 
use modular or market based mechanisms with their value chain partners but, do not make any attempt 
to codify and standardize information security risks, make themselves vulnerable to blended attacks to 
their critical information infrastructure and assets. When there is a mismatch between the governance 
needs of the value chain and the governance needs for information security, organizations need to 
carefully consider their information security policies and procedures and ensure that value chain 
governance archetypes are extended meet their information security needs.  
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